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Knowledge of actual Federal  Reserve behavior is important  in studies of monetary policy and 
financial markets  for at least two reasons.  First, the interpretation  of variables chosen to represent the 
monetary  policy process may  be marred  if they  do not correspond to variables  actually used by the 
Federal Reserve to implement  monetary  policy or to gauge its performance.  Accordingly, the Federal 
Reserve's  choices regarding  targets, intermediate  targets, and  instruments  may play  a key role  in 
research  design.1  Unfortunately,  information  regarding these choices is not always  easy to obtain. 
Relevant Federal  Reserve policy statements,  such as the FOMC policy directive,  are released with a 
substantial  delay  and  often  are ambiguous.2  Thus,  additional  knowledge regarding  actual  Federal 
Reserve behavior may have a methodological payoff.3 
Second, the recurrent  issue of policy credibility requires an  assessment of the extent to which 
Federal  Reserve statements find  a reflection in the beliefs and  behavior of economic agents.  While 
credibility potentially  has a variety of interpretations, all would seem to require that a shxft in stated 
policy objectives and instruments be  associated with  at least some change in market  behavior.  Thus, 
additional  knowledge regarding  Federal  Reserve behavior, and  the financial  market's  reaction to it, 
may help illuminate the credibility issue. 
This  paper examines  actual  Federal  Reserve  behavior  from a financial  markets  perspective. 
Movements in interest rates are used as the metric in this exercise.  The underlying presumption is that 
financial market  participants  fully understand  Federal Reserve behavior.  This  position is sensible for 
two  reasons.  First, many financial  market participants  are  former  Federal  Reserve officials  and 
economists.  Second, given the key role of the Federal Reserve in influencing interest  rates in at least 
the short-run, market participants  have a  strong incentive to study Federal Reserve behavior. 
Following this introductory section, a framework for examining monetary  policy is presented in 
the  first section.  Within  this  framework,  several  different  types  of monetary  policy regimes are distinguished.  In the second section, the implications of the different monetary  policy regimes on the 
hehavior of interest  rates  are discussed.  The third  section presents empirical  resolD u sotual  Federal 
Reserve behavior.  The period beginning in 1980 and ending in early 1987 is considered,  This period is 
interesting  in that  Federal  Reserve statements indicate that  monetary  policy changed  several times. 
Thus  specific instances  of Federal  Reserve behavior can be analyzed  in terms of the credibility  of 
pohcymakers.  The main conclusions are summarized in the final section. 
I.  The Monetary jic Frawrk 
Several aspects  of monetary  policy are reviewed in a stylized framework in this section  The 
long-run objectives of monetary  oolicy are first considered.  These long-run objectives involve both  the 
targets and intermediate  targets of  policy over a gwen year.  Next, several features  pertaining to short- 
run rr.onetary  policy are discussed.  it is  argued that to interpret Federai  Reserve behsvior correctly. 
the  short-run  impemertation  of  monetary  policy must  be  examined.  Different types of' short-run 
policies are distinguished  both  by the type of operating procedure implemented  by  the Federal Resent 
and by the desire to offset deviations  from the targets 
A.  Monetary Policy Qçjives 
The uncertainties  facing  the Federal  Reserve make monetary  policy a particularly  challenging 
task,  even  apart  from outside  political  pressures.  The  first  choice facing  .poticymskers is to decide 
whetF.sr  policy should  be  based  directly on a set of ultimate targets, such as  output, employment. 
inflation,  and  foreign exchange  rates, or on  an  intermediate  target.  Potential  intermediate  targets 
include monetary  and credit  aggregates,  as well as other indicators  from financial  markets,  including 
interest  rates. 
In the mid to late 1970s, the intermediate target procedure was progressively made more of a 
formal part of Federal Reserve policy.  Coinciding with this adoption,  the Federal  Reserve initiated a 
series of annual targets for monetary  and  credit  aggregates.  This procedure  was formalized further 
under  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act  in  1978, which imposed a single  non-overlapping  calendar  year 
policy period on the Federal Reserve. 
By the early 1980s, the intermediate  target procedure  was firmly  entrenched .Nevertheless, 
2 some ambiguities  were apparent.  One area  of ambiguity  involved the appropriate  weights to be placed 
on  the various  intermediate  targets, particularly  MI  and  M2,  in formulating  policy.  A second area 
involved  uncertainties  about the proper definition of the narrowly defined money stock,  MI.  Despite 
problems  in  determining  an  appropriate  definition  for  Ml,  and the related  problem  of erratic MI 
velocity, Ml was the main focus of monetary policy.  One reason for the use of Ml was its timeliness. 
Preliminary  Mi data  are  available  weekly  with  a lag of about 1-1/2  weeks, while data on  broader 
monetary  aggregates  are available only  monthly.  Many of the components of the broader aggregates 
are,  however,  available  weekly.  A  second  was that  Ml  was the  traditionally  preferred  monetary 
aggregate  because of its intended link with transactions  balances.  Another  reason was that the reserve 
requirements  applied  to  non-Mi  components of the  broader aggregates are either  zero or  very low, 
implying a potentially  loose relationship between reserves and the broader aggregates. 
Because  of  the  continuing  erratic behavior  of  Ml  velocity,  the  Federal  Reserve virtually 
abandoned  its intermediate  target  procedure by  the mid-1980s.  In the record of policy actions at the 
November  2,  1987  FOMC  meeting,  for  example,  the  FOMC's  domestic  policy  directive  listed  the 
behavior  of the  monetary  aggregates last among  four  items that could cause the Federal  Reserve  to 
charge current  pressure on  reserve positions.  The first  three items  were the strength of the business 
expansion, inflationary  pressures, and  developments in foreign exchange markets.  Thus.  policymakers 
were looking directly at measures of economic performance.  It also is noteworthy that the items in this 
list occasionally change order.  Developments in foreign exchange markets,  for example, had been listed 
first a  few months earlier, 
The above is clearly a casual interpretation  of monetary  policy objectives in the 1980s.  It does, 
nevertheless, suggest several hypotheses about Federal Reserve behavior.  These  hypotheses are tested 
in the  third  section.  However,  to interpret Federal  Reserve behavior  more precisely,  the  short-run 
implementation  of policy must be considered. 
B.  Short-Run  Monetary j]j 
The Federal Reserve's short-run  monetary  policy can be described in terms of two factors.  The 
first concerns the rate at which the Federal Reserve attempts to offset any deviation from its target  or 
3 intermediate  target.  The second is the type of operating procedure adopted.  This latter area  involves 
the choice of an instrument,  or operating target, to conduct  monetary  policy. 
The view of monetary  policy advanced here is that the Federal Reserve does not initiate short-. 
run  shocks  to  the  monetary  aggregates;  it  merely reacts to  them.  This  view  seems particularly 
appropriate  prior to Fehruary  1984, when contemporaneous reserve requirements (CRR) were adopted. 
Under  the lagged  reserve requirement  (LRR)  system  in  effect from  1968  to that time,  there was no 
direct  link  between hank reserves and  MI  in a given week,  As a consequence, the money stock was 
essentially  demand determined,  and  monetary  shocks  reflected  shifts  in the  public's  demand for 
money.4 
Given that  observed monetary  shocks represent  new  information  to boththe public and  the 
Fcderal Reserve, the relevant issue for policymakers is to determin  the desired adjustment  toward the 
monetary  target.  Casual evidence suggests that this adjustment  speed may have changed at least twice 
since the late  1970s.  In particular,  the Federal Reserve committed itself more ciosely  to Ml targets  in 
October  1979, implying  that any deviation  from the monetary  targets would be offset more quickly 
than before.  In October 1982, the Federal Reserve de-emphssized its monetary  targets,  implying slower 
adjustment  speeds. 
At the same time that the Federal Reserve changes adjustment  speeds, it may also change its 
operating  procedures.  The  choice of operating  procedures,  however,  is logically independent  of the 
desired rate of adjustment.  That is. any of the three most prominent types of operating  procedures -- 
the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and borrowed reserves procedures -- can  potentially  yield 
virtually  the same rate of adjustment.5  Nevertheless, the adoption  of a federal funds rate, or money 
market  conditions,  operating  procedure  is  frequently  interpreted as  an abandonment  of monetary 
targets.  Similarly,  the  adoption  of  the  nonborrowed  reserves, or reserves aggregate,  procedure  in 
October  1979 is often viewed as being consistent  with a greater  desire to offset monetary  shocks.  As 
discussed in the  next  section,  actual  interest  rate behavior  can be used  to  infer  both the type of 
operating  procedure adopted by the Federal Reserve and the desired rate at which monetary  shocks are 
offset. 
4 II,  Imolications for Interest Bii 
Market  interest  rate data are used to represent the actions of financial  arket participants. It 
is  further  assumed  that  market  participants fully  understand  Federal  Reserve  behavior.  As  a 
consequence,  the  Federal  Reserves  reaction function  can  be  inferred under this rational expectations 
assumption.  Moreover, changes in the estimated reaction  function  can  be used to infer  changes in 
monetary  policy regimes. 
Three aspects of interest rate behavior are considered here.  These are the volatility of interest 
rates,  the response of interest rates  to weekly MI announcements, and the response of interest rates to 
new information  about inflation, economic activity,  and exchange rates.  Differences in the volatility  of 
interest  rates  in different  periods are  used to infer changes in  Federal  Reserve operating  procedures. 
Similarly, changes in  the response of interest  rates  to Ml announcements also are used to infer changes 
in operating  procedures as well as different degrees of emphasis on Ml targets. Finally, the response of 
interest  rates  to other economic information  is used to infer the targets of monetary  policy during a 
particular period. 
A.  Volatility of Interest EI 
The volatility  of the federal  funds rate depends  on  disturbances  affecting the market  for 
reserves,  Federal  Reserve  intervention  in  the reserves market  through  open market operations,  and the 
market's perception  of the type  of operating  procedure being used,  If the  market  believes that the 
Federal  Reserve will offset  shocks affecting the  reserves market  through  open market  operations,  and 
the shocks are  in fact offset fairly  quickly, the federal funds rate will be relatively stable over a short 
period, such as a week.  If disturbances  in either  the demand  for or supply  of reserves are not expected 
to be  offset, however, the federal  funds rate will move quickly to clear the reserves market.  Different 
operating  procedures imply different behavior for the federal funds rate through these channels.6 
Under  the federal funds rate procedure, the Federal  Reserve offsets most shocks affecting the 
reserves market to keep the federal funds rate relatively stable over a given period, such as a week. 
Even under this procedure, however, the federal funds rate would be expected to exhibit some volatility 
) over time.  In particular,  to offset deviations in money growth from its target, the Federal Reserve may 
initiate  discretionary  changes  in  the  rate,  Nevertheless,  in  comparison  to  the  other  operating 
procedures discussed below, the federal funds rate should be relatively more stable under  this procedure. 
Under  the  nonborrowed reserves procedure, moat disturbances affecting the reserves  market, 
and  therefore  the  federal  funds  rate, are not offset.  Instead,  the  nonborrowed  reserves path  is 
maintained  over a given period and the federal funds rate fluctuates in response to shocks either to the 
demand  fur or supply  of reserves,  As a result, the federal funds rate would be expected to be more 
volatile under this procedure. 
The final  procedure considered is the borrowed reserves procedure.  Under this procedure, the 
Federal  Reserve can be.  characterized  as  attempting  to' achieve a certain  level of  discdunt  window 
borrowing over a given period.  In this case, unanticipated  changes in either  required or excess reserves 
are accommodated  by changing  nonborrowed reserves,  If the demand for  required reserves is higher 
than expected,  fur  example,  the  federal funds  rate rises  initially  and  borrowing  increases to equate 
supply and demand  in the reserves market.  To offset  the increase in borrowing, nonborrowed reserves 
are increased until the federal funds rate falls to its  previous level.  In contrast,  if a shock originating in 
the demand for borrowed reserves occurs in  which  borrowing is higher than expected at every level of 
the federal funds rate,  this disturbance  is at most partially  offset and the federal funds rate falls.  The 
decline in the federal funds rate serves to reduce the demand  for borrowed reserves.  So, this source of 
disturbances  in the reserves market  causes fluctuations  in the federal  funds rate.  In comparison  with 
the other procedures,  the borrowed reserves procedure implies more short-run volatility in the federal 
funds  rate than the federal  funds  rate procedure and  less volatility than the  nonborrowed  reserves 
procedure.7 
The volatility  of other interest rates,  such as the 3-month  Treasury bill yield, also depends on 
the type of operating  procedure employed by the Federal Reserve, although  to a lesser extent. The 3- 
month  Treasury  bill  yield  depends  on  both  the current  federal  funds rate and  the rate expected in 
future weeks.  If the curreot  week's federal funds rate fluctuates, then some of this volatility is reflected 
in the Treasury bill yield. Treasury  bill  yields  also fluctuate  if financial  market  participants change  their assessments 
about the federal funds rate in future  weeks.  Monetary  targets are important in examining this link. 
If new information  about either money or the economy suggest8, for example,  that the future level of 
the money stock will be higher than  previously  expected, the Treasury bill yield may rise if the market 
expects  the Federal  Reserve to offset  this increase.  In  this instance, the market expects the Federal 
Reserve to  attempt  to achieve  a  particular monetary target,  and  the  magnitude  of the  increase in 
interest  rates  reflects  the desired speed of short-run  adjustment.back  to  the target  level.  Alternatively, 
if the Federal Reserve places little or no weight on a particular monetary target, the market will expect 
future  levels  of  the federal funds rate to  be  as previously  predicted.  So,  for a given monetary 
disturbance,  the greater the Federal Reserve's commitment  to achieve a particular monetary target, the 
greater the coinciding fluctuation in longer  term yields. 
B.  Response to  g  Economic Announcements 
The response of interest  rates  to  money  and  economic  announcements  provides  futher 
evidence  on the type  of operating  procedure  adopted  by the Federal  Reserve, as well a.s  the degree of 
emphasis  placed on  various  targets  and  intermediate  targets of policy.  In particular, the response of 
the federal funds rate depends on the type  of operating  procedure.  The response of longer-term yields 
depends  somewhat on  the operating  procedure, but it depends more importantly  on  the  intermediate 
target  or target  of policy.  The responses to Ml announcements and other economic announcements are 
considered separately below. 
First, consider  the  response to  the  federal  funds  rate to  weekly Ml  announcements.  Th 
response depends  directly on  the type of operating  procedure  employed by  the  Federal  Reserve,  In 
particular,  the response depends on whether the corresponding shock to the market for reserves is offset. 
The  reserves  market is  affected  by  unanticipated  announced  changes  in  Ml  initially  through  the 
market's assessment of the demand  for  required  reserves.  Under  the LRR system  in  effect  before 
February  1984, required  reserves depended on the level of the money stock two weeks  previously, the 
statement week corresponding  to  the  current  week's money  announcement  data.  Under the  CRR 
system adopted in February  1984, required reserves depend on the current  money stock, with a lag of two days.8  As a consequence, the money announcement  data under  CRR do not coincide with the 
current  reserves  periods.  Unanticipated  announced changes  in Ml may still  affect the demand for 
reserves,  however, if the  unanticipated  changes have  persistent  effects on future  levels of the money 
stock,  That  is,  the  current  week's  demand  for reserves  would  he  affected  if a positive  money 
announcement  surprise  causes market  participants  to  raise  their assessments of the  current  week's 
money stock. 
Under  the federal  funds rate procedure,  the federal  funds  rate should  not  respond to money 
announcement  surprises,  in this case, market participants  expect the Federal Reserve to accommodate 
the implied shock in the reserves market,  In contrast, the federal funds rate should increase in response 
to a positive money announcement surprise under the nonborrowed reserves procedure.  This  rise is due 
to a higher assessment of the demand for reserves that  is not expected to be accommodated through 
Federal  Reserve open msrket  operations.  Similar to the federal funds rate procedure, the federal funds 
rate should not respond to money announcement surprises under the borrowed reserves procedure.  This 
behavior  follows because the  Federal Reserve accommodates shocks to the demand for reserves under 
this operating  procedure. 
The response  of Treasury  bill  yields and  other longer term  yields to  money announcement 
surprises  depends partly on  the  response of the federal  funds  rate.  Most of the  response. however, 
depends  on  the extent to which the market expects  the  Federal  Reserve to  offset the  shock in  the 
future.  In particular,  the response is greater the more quickly the Federal  Reserve  acts to offset the 
money  surprise.  So, the response to the Treasury  bill  yield  to money announcement  surprises can be 
used tn determine whether the Federal Reserve is perceived to he attempting to achieve its Ml target.9 
The response of Treasury bill yields to unanticipated  announced changes in economic activity 
and inflation may operate through  the same channels as money announcements if these other economic 
announcements  provide information  useful in predicting  money demand.  In particular, if either  real 
economic  activity or  inflation  is  higher than expected,  the market may raise its assessment  of the 
current  and  future  week's demand for  money.  interest  rates,  then, wnuld  be expected  to  rise  in 
response  to this  new  information  about the  domestic  economy if the  market  does  not expect  the 
8 Federal  Reserve to accommodate  the increased demand.  A 8imilar direct link between exchange rate 
movements  and the demand for money is not evident. 
The primary  effect of new information about economic activity, inflation,  and foreign exchange 
rates  on interest  rates is likely due to the direct value of this information.  That is, if  policymakers are 
placing  more  weight  on  their  targets, and less  weight on  their  intermediate  monetary  targets,  new 
information  about the economy and exchange rates may cause immediate  interest rate movements.  If 
inflation  is  announced  to  be  higher  than  expected,  for  example,  policymakers  may  adopt  more 
restrictive  policies, causing  interest  rates  to rise immediately.  The effect  could be the same  for an 
unexpectedly  large  increase in  economic activity,  especially during  the  later  stages of an  economic 
expansion when concern about future  inflation is growing.  Moreover, if the Federal Reserve is focusing 
directly on the value of the dollar in currency markets,  new information about exchange rates  may lead 
to immediate  interest rate movements.  Depending on  the  Federal Reserves  ernphass on this  type of 
direct  information  about its  ultimate targets,  the  response of  interest  rates  may  have  varied  over 
different periods. 
Ill.  Empirical Results 
The various aspects of interest rate behavior discussed in the previous section are used below  to 
test hypotheses  about the  behavior  to  the  Federal  Reserve in conducting  monetary  policy.  Three 
separate  periods are examined  since 1980.  The first actually  begins in October 1979, when  the Federal 
Reserve  announced  a new  operating  procedure along  with  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  monetary 
aggregates.  This  new  procedure corresponds to the nonborrowed reserves procedure  discussed in the 
previous section.  The second period begins in October 1982, when the Federal  Reserve announced the 
abandoned  the nonborrowed reserves procedure in favor of the borrowed reserves operating  procedure. 
At  that  time,  somewhat  less  emphasis  also  may  have  been  placed  on  the  monetary  aggregates  — 
specifically  Ml -- as intermediate  targets.  The third period begins in  February  1984, coinciding with 
the implementation  of CRR.  Because of the uncertainties  regarding the effects of CRR  among other 
factors,  the Federal  Reserve may  have  dc-emphasized the role of the  monetary  aggregates further  in 
9 this  period.10  Another  period,  beginning  in  October  1977  and  ending  in  October  1979, also  is 
examined to compare the monetary  policy regimes in the 1980s with  monetary  policy in the late 1970s. 
Prior to October 1979, the federal funds rate procedure was in effect. 
A.  Volatility of Interest 
The volatility  of the federal  funds rate and the 3-month  Treasury  hill yield  is examined 
over four periods in Table  1.  As is apparent in the table, the weekly volatility of  the federal funds rate 
TABLE I 
is  consistent  with the  changes  in  operating  procedures  hypothesized  previously.  in  particular.  in 
cbntparisun tu the pre-October 1979 period, the standard  deviation of weekly percentage changes in the 
federal funds rate was about four  times  as  large in the October  1979 - October 1982 period.  This 
behavior is consistent with a switch to the nonhorrowed reserves procedure from the federal funds rate 
procedure.  The volatility then declined to about half that of the October 1979 -  October  1982 period in 
both  of  the  periods  after  October  1982.  Despite this  decline,  the  volatility since October  1982 is 
significantly  larger than that  experienced prior to October  1979,  suggesting that the Federal  Reserve 
did  not return  to  the  federal  funds  rate procedure.1'  Instead,  the evidence is consistent  with the 
adoption of the borrowed reserves procedure. 
Similar to  the volatility  of the federal funds rate, the volatility  of the 3-month  Treasury bill 
yield also increased significantly following October 1979.  In contrast to the federal funds rate, however, 
volatility  after October 1982 returned to pre-October 1979 levels.  While some portion  of the volatility 
of the Treasury  bill  yield should  reflect the  volatility  of the federal  funds  rate, a larger part can be 
attributed to changes  in the  market's  expectation  about future  monetary  policy,  As  a  result,  the 
increased volatility  of the Treasury  bill  yield in the October  1979 - October 1982  period is consistent 
with a greater commitment  of the Federal Reserve to offset a given shock affecting the money stock, 
while the  decline in  volatility  after  October  1982 suggests  the opposite.  Other  evidence, however, 
10 allows more direct inference about this possible shift. 
B.  Response to MQ!  Economic Announcements 
To  provide  further  evidence  on  changes  in  monetary  policy  operating  procedures, 
hypotheses discussed in  the  previous section  about  the  response of the federal  funds  rate to money 
announcement  surprises are  first  tested.  Then, to determine  the market's assessment of the Federal 
Reserve's targets and intermediate  targets, the response of the 3—month Treasury  bill  yields to money 
and other economic announcements  is examined empirically. 
The usual efficient markets model is used to estimate  the responses of both the federal funds 
rate and  the  3-month  Treasury  bill  yield.  This  model  relates  daily changes  in  interest  rates  to 
unanticipated  announced changes in  money and other economic variables.  With the exception of the 
exchange rate variable,  unanticipated  changes are measured as  the difference between announced and 
expected values.  The expected values are taken from a survey  conducted by Money Market  Services. 
Inc.  The survey data are further  adjusted, however, to take  into account  information from the time  of 
the survey to the  time of the  announcement.'2  If the Federal  Reserve -- and  therefore the market  -- 
views  new information  about a particular  variable as being relevant for policy, the estimated  response 
of interest rates should be significant. 
The estimated  response of the federal funds rate to the unanticipated  component of weekly Ml 
announcements is reported in Table  2.  The only statistically  significant response occurs in the January 
TABLE 2 
198Q  - October 1982  period, consistent  with  the nonborrowed reserves procedure.13  In the two post- 
October  1982 periods, the  response  is  insignificantly different  from zero,  consistent  with  either  the 
federal funds rate or borrowed reserves procedures.  Although estimates  are not reported here, previous 
studies  find  that  the response  also is insignificantly different  from  zero prior  to October  1979 [e.g., 
Roley  and  Walsh  (1985)].  Combined  with  the  evidence from  Table  1,  the  results  support the 
hypothesis that  the  Federal  Reserve operated  under a federal  funds rate procedure  prior to  October 
1979,  and  then  implemented  the nonborrowed reserves procedure during the  October  1979 -  October 
11 1982 period.  After October 1982, the combined evidence from Tablss 1  and 2 suggests that the Federal 
Reserve adopted  the borrowed reaerves  procedure. 
To determine the relative  importance of various targets  and intermediate  targeta  of monetary 
policy, the response of the 3-month  Treasury  bill  yield to a set of economic variables is estimated  in 
Table  3.  In  addition to  weekly  Ml  announcements,  the  unanticipated components  of monthly 
annnuncements  of  the  producer  price index,  consumer  price  index,  industrial  production.  and the 
unemployment  rate are considered.  Daily changes in the yen/dollar  exchange rate also are included to 
estimate  the significance of foreign exchange rate factors.  Yen/dollar rate changes are measured as the 
difference in ciosing and opening quotes in the Tokyo market each day.  Thus,  such movements in the 
Tokyo  market cao be regacded as news  to traders  in  New  York, since these movements are recorded 
when the New York idarket is  ciosed. 
TABLE 3 
The  results  in  Table  3  indicate that the role of Ml targets successively diminished over  the 
three periods  since  1980.  and  the  differences across  periods are  significant  at the  5  percent  level. 
Moreover,  since  February  1984,  the  response  of  the  3-month  Tressury bill  yield  to  weekly  Ml 
announcements  is insignificant!y different from zero'4  While the role of Mi has decreased, the reeulte 
suggest that the effect of direct  information about the domestic economy  has increased over  time.  As 
indicated  by  the  reported  F-statistics,  the  hypothesis  that  new  information  about  inflation, 
unemployment,  and  output does not affect  interest rates  can  be  rejected at the 5 percent level in  the 
February  1984 -  September  1986 period.  The  most  significant  variable  during  this  latter period  is 
industrial  production, suggesting that the  Federal Reserve was looking directly at  the performance of 
the economy in conducting policy.  Finally, yen/dollar  exchange rate movements  are not estimated  to 
have had significant effects overall, though intermittent effects cannot be  ruled out.' 
12 IV.  Conclusions 
This  paper  exploited  the  financial  market's  understanding  of  Federal  Reserve behavior  in 
considering  changes in monetary  policy.  In particular,  both  interest  rate volatility  and the financial 
market's perception of the Federal  Reserve's reaction function were osed to examine several monetary 
policy  regimes over  the  last decade.  One  regime began  in October  1979,  when  the  Federal  Reserve 
adopted  a nonhorrow"d  reserves  operating  procedure and placed  greater  emphasis  on  Ml.  Prior to 
October  1979,  the  fedrai funds  rate operating  procedure  was to effect.  In  October  1982, monetary 
policy shi1ted to a borrowed  reserves operating procedure  and a diminished  role for Mi.  Finally, in 
February 19k4, stil  less weight was placed on Ml as an intermediate  target of policy, with more weight 
placed  directly  or.  the performance  of the domestic  economy  These  d,fferent  periodc correspond to 
Federal  Reser.e start-ri.rnts about changes in policy, and, as a whole,  the evidence suggests tha  actual 
changes wet" n.ade.  To that extent. tne evidence suggests that piliry was credible. 
To anayce the motives  surrounding the  Federal Reserre's  formulation  and inplcnientation of 
niooetary  1eAtry, it seems particularly  worthwhile to study  these specific episodes on a  case study basis. 
Such a sun>  nay  reseal  the relative  importance placed on political  and economic factors influencing 
Federal  lleser'.e behasior.  In brief, it appears that both factors are important.  'The change in policy in 
October  197  for exa'nple.  was drisen by  the desire to  ncrcase interest rates to defend the dollar in 
foreign  eamhange  narkets  and  to  reduce  inflation  in the  U.S.  A  slowdown  in the  growth  of the 
monetary  aggregates  also was desired  to reduce infiatioo  in the future.  Under  the  federal funds rate 
procedure  in  effect prior to  October  1979. the  Federal  Reserve would  be blamed  for a sharp  rise in 
interest  rates.  To deflect  such  criticism,  policymakers  adopted  a  procedure  in  which  "the market 
determines  rates," the nooborrowed reserves procedure.  At the same time,  there was some hope that 
this  procedure  would  allow  closer control  of Ml and  hence reduce the prospects  of continued  high 
inflation. 
Similar economic and political choices were made in 1982.  In particular, by October  1982, the 
behavior  of both Ml and the economy  was seemingly becoming more unpredictable,  and the Federal 
Reserve's  independence was being threatened  by the Congress.  Policymakers decided  to weakeo the 
13 link  between  Ml  and  interest  rates,  thereby  reducing  interest  rate  volatility  Nevertheless  the 
advantage  of some interest  rate volatility  due to market factors was the lack of blame attached to the 
Federal  Reserve  for a particular  level of  interest  rates.  As  a  consequence, the  borrowed reserves 
procedure  was  adopted,  in  which  the  federal  funds  rate  fluctuated  in  response  to  errors  in  the 
borrowings  function.  In  this  sense, the  Federal  Reserve could  continue  to  claim  that  it  was not 
targeting a particular level of interest  rates.  A macroeconomic  justification  for the borrowed reserves 
procedure is not, however, readily apparent,  as the added volatility of interest rates  created by random 
shifts  in discount window borrowing creates no clear benefit.16 
The third regime  in the  I980s appears to have  been  due primarily  to  an economic decisioo 
based on the uncertainties f  the economic environment,  Jo particular,  the implementation of  CRR  in 
February  1984 had  the potential  of affecting the behavior of an already unpredictable  money stock as 
well as  altering  the  previous rslatiooships  between reserves aod  money.  This  change  was a delayed 
product  of the nonborrowed reserves regime, as closer monetary  control  was more  likely  under  CRR 
than LRR.  Because of the added uncertainties surrounding CRR and the continuing  erratic behavior of 
Ml  velocity, policymakers  dc-emphasized their monetary targets further,  and  the  borrowed reserves 
procedure was maintained. 
In sum..t  e behavior of the Federal Reserve  in conducting monetary  policy is best described by 
considering the  Federal  Reserve's  operating  procedures, targets,  and  desire  to  achieve  its  targets. 
Changes in these factors  led to at least three different policy regimes in the 1980s.'  Jo these regimes 
the importance  to the Federal  Reserve of tight monetary control  increased initially  and  subsequently 
became  negligible.  The  lasting  inheritance  of the  regime shift  that  began  in  October  1979  is the 
Federal  Reserve's substantially  greater  willingness to tolerate interest-rate  volatility.  Regardless of the 
specific details  of  the  operating  procedures  adopted, there apparently has  been  no  reversion to the 
federal funds rate procedure employed in the late  1970s. 
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1.  The terminology used here for  targets,  intermediate  targets, and instruments of policy follows 
B.  Friedman (1975). 
2.  Mayer (l97) and  Goodfriend (1986) discuss  issues  relating to  the disclosure of the  FOMC's 
policy  directive in detail. 
3.  One example  among many possible illustrations,  wo.ild be  the avoidaoce  of confusion between 
use of  an  interest  rate  instrument  to  achieve a  particular  policy  target and  interest  rate 
targeting  where the level  of an  interest rate itself  is the policy objective. 
4.  For further discussion on tins issue, see LeRoy (1979. Hetcel (1982), and Roley (1987). 
5.  The nonborrowed reserves procedure is  potentially  slightly faster because  of federal funds rate 
moserncnts  in the current  week.  This  property  is discussed further in the next section.  Also 
see Roley  1987). 
6.  For a more detailed  discussion of these operating  procedures, see Roley (1987). 
7.  A variant of the federal  funds rate procedure  which apparently  was introduced  following the 
sharp  decline of  the  stock  market on October  19,  1987  is intermediate  between  the federal 
funds rate procedure described above and the borrowed reserves procedure.  In contrast to the 
earlier funds rate procedure, in which the Federal Reserve entered the reserves market almost 
daily to  add or drain  reserves in order to  keep the  funds rate close to target, open  market 
operations  under  the variant procedure are relatively sparse and generally limited  to adding or 
draining  reserves, but not  both,  during  a reserves maintenance  period.  In  this  regard,  the 
variant resembles  the  borrowed reserves procedure.  The main difference  is  that there is no 
explicit target for borrowed reserves, so that shocks to banks' demand for borrowed reserves do 
not (in  principle) affect the funds rate.  Some market participants  have  described the variant 
15 procedure as a "fuzzy" funds rate target, since  the allowable deviation of the actual  rate from 
the target is  larger  than under  the  earlier funds  rate procedure.  The Federal  Reserve has 
announced  its  intention  to  revert  to the borrowed  reserves procedure  at some  point  in the 
future. 
8.  Also,  reserve computation  and maintenance periods are two weeks in length, while they lasted 
one week under  LRR.  The response under 2-week  CRR is examined in detail by Roley (1987). 
9.  Considerable  evidence suggests that the response of Treasury  bill  yields to Ml announcements 
is a response in the real rate, not expected inflation.  One  type of evidence is from the response 
of foreign exchange rates  to Ml announcement surprises.  In particular,  the dollar appreciates 
in response to positive money announcement surprises.  See, for example, Cornell (1982), Engle 
and Frankel (1984), and Flardouvelis (1984). 
10.  The introduction  of CRR introduced at least two uncertainties.  First, the previous relationship 
-  describing  the  demand  for  reserves changed,  leading  to  uncertainties  about the  effects of 
various shocks on the federal funds rate.  Second, the stochastic  behavior of the money stock 
itself  was potentially  affected, as it was no longer entirely demand  determined in a given week. 
Ii.  The test of the hypothesis that the two post-October 1982 periods have the same volatility  as 
the pre-October  1979 period yields F-statistics of 3.88  (64, 100) and  5.29  (154, 100), which are 
significant at the 5 percent level, 
12.  The change in the Treasury bill yield over the previous five business days is used as a proxy for 
this information.  See Roley (1983). 
13.  The  results  are  qualitatively  the  same when  the  estimation  period starts  in  October  1979 
instead  of January 1980.  See Roley and Walsh (1985).  To conform with  the results in Table 
3, the January 1980 starting  period was used.  This  date  was chosen because of the availability 
of data for the exchange rate variable used in Table 3. 
14.  In a specification analogous to that used in Table 2, the response of the Treasury  bill  yield to 
money announcement  surprises also  was examined over additional subperiode.  In particular, 
starting with  September  29,  1977, the response was estimated  for overlapping 26 week periods, 
16 beginning every 13  weeks.  The first two estimation  periods, for example,  were  September  29, 
1977 - March  23, 1978 and December 29,  1977 - June  22, 1978, respectively.  The results from 
these regressions generally support  the beginning and ending dates of the subsarnplea used in 
the  tables.  In  particular, all  responses after the June  1982 -  December  1982 period  were 
estimated  to be smaller than those of this period.  Moreover, the responses in both  the June 
1983 -  December  1983 and September  1983  March 1984 periods were statistically  significant 
at the  5  percent level, but the esttrnated  responses starting with the Decerriber 1983 -  June 
1984 period were not significant.  This result is consiscent with a change in thc response around 
the beginring of 1984, 
15.  Positive  ar,d  negative  movements  also  were  considered  separately,  but  the  statistical 
significance of the revolts did nt clang" 
16.  The  borrowed reserves procedure  was implemented  under  LRR.  Under CRR,  hos,eer,  this 
procedure -nay be  capable of offsetting shocks from money and factors supplying reserves.  See, 
for example, Roth and Seibert '1983). 
17.  And, as noted  in footnote  7, a fourth regime may have begun following the October  19,  1987 
stock-market crash. 
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19 TABLE 2 
Response of the Federsl Funds Rate to  Ml Announcements 
Coeffioient  Estimates  Summary Statistics  Estimation  — 
Period  Constant  UM1  41  R2  SE  OW  F(m,c) 
jan, 1980—  0.0277  0.0994*  —0.0121  0.11  0.59  2.70 
Oct. 1982  (0.0515)  (0.0228)  (0.0291) 
Oct. 1982-  0.0413  0.0137  0.0016  -0.01  0.20  1.76  10.71* 
Feb. 1984  (0.0272)  (0.0128)  (0.0122)  (1,203) 
Feb. 1984-  _0.O872*  0.0103  -0.0089  0.01  0.22  1.97  0.04 
Feb. 1987  (0.0191)  (0.0103)  (0.0055)  (1,219) 
Notes:  The preoise estimstion period dstes  are:  Jsnusry 1,  1980 — October  5 
1982; Ootober 6,  1982 — Februsry  1, 1984;  and February 2, 1984 — February 
28, 1987.  Obsenstions  in the last week of each year are deleted to avoid 
the influence  of excessive year end  interest rate movements.  Numbers in 
parentheses  sre stsndsrd  errors of estimated coefficients.  Equations sre 
estimated in the form: 
LRFF  =b +b UM1  +bEMl +e 
t  0  1  t  2  t  t 
where b  ,  b.  ,  and  b  are  estimated  coefficients  and  e  ía a random error  0  2  8  term. 
* 
Srgnificant  at the  5 percent level. 
4RFFt 
= change  in the fedaral  funds rate from the day of the money announcement 
to the next business dsy. 
UM1  money announcement  surprise,  defined as  Ml  — 8l, where Mi is the anncunccd 
change in the narrowly defined  money stock,  in billions of dollars. 
= expected  announced chsnge in the narrowly  defined money stock,  based cc the 
survey  measure provided by  Money Market Services, Inc. 
= multiple correlation  coefficient  corrected for degrees  of freedom. 
SE  standard error. 
OW  = Ourbin—Wateon  statistic. 
F(m,m)  F—statistic  with  (m,:) degrees of freedom  for the hypothesis that the 
response coefficient,  b1, is the  same ss that  estimated in the previ- 
ous period.  In this tet, the estimated equations sre weighted by  their standard errors. 
20 TABLE 1 
Volatility of Interest Rates 
Standard  Deviations of  Weekly Percentage Changes 
Oct. 1977—  Oct. 1979—  Oct. 1982—  Feb. 1984— 
Interest Rate  Oct. 1979  Oct. 1932  Feb. 1984  Feb. 1937 
Federal  Fonda rate  0.019  0.077  0.037  0.043 
*  *  * 
F(m,n)  16.89  4.36  1.37 
(150,  99)  (150,  64)  (154,  64) 
p—value  0.00  0.1 a l02  0.05 
3—month  euty  0.027 
0.05:  0.02: 
0.021 
F(m,n)  4,62  5.08  1.53 
(150,  99  '150,  64)  '54,  154) 
-15  a 
p—value  u.2  a  L0  0. s  10 
Notes:  The intereat rate quote on  the day following  each week's  money announcement 
is used to form weekly  percentage changes.  The number in the  f'rst row and 
first coiumn, for example, denotes  s standard dewiation of weekly percent— 
age cionges of 1.9 percent.  The last weekly observat:on  of each year is 
deleted to avoio  the  Influence of  excessive  year  end  interest rate movenenta. 
Significant  at  the  5  percent level. 
F(m,n)  F—statistic with  (m,n)  degrees of freedom for  the hypothesis that the vari- 
ance is the  same as that  in the previous period. 
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t
h
a
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
i
r
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
F
2
(
m
,
n
)
F
-
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
w
i
t
h
 
(
m
,
n
)
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
s
o
f
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
b
1
h
2
=
b
4
0
.